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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of ad hoc rulemaking with retroactive effect; the dissent pointed
out that the decision actually represented a direct reversal of the
court's stand on such problems. It also contended that the decision
was a reversal of the 1943 decision.9
Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized the fact that no general rule
had previously been adopted because the situation involved had
never before been presented to the commission. He denied that
experience could be deferred to in a situation which had never
arisen before. This denial seemingly overlooks the fact that
expertise applies generally to familiarity in the field wherein the
problem arises, with all its ramifications, rather than to a partic-
ular situation.
This overlooked fact seems to be the true basis on which the
majority recognizes such ad hoc action in complex and technical
fact situations. Such recognition appears to be in accord with
several cases decided in the interim between the two Chenery
decisions."°
ROBERT L. ROLAND, III
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL RIGHTS TO TIDELANDs-The
United States brought action against the State of California, alleging
that the United States was the owner in fee simple, or possessed of
paramount rights in and power over, the land and things of value
underlying the Pacific Ocean off the coast of California beyond the
low water mark and extending three nautical miles seaward, and
that California, without the authority of the United States, had
executed certain mineral leases in this area. The prayer was for a
9. 67 S. Ct. 1760 (1947). While the majority opinion is not utterly irrecon-
cilable with its earlier decision, it truly represents a change of attitude-hence
the significance of the decision.
10. Notably the cases of Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Securities &
Exchange Commission, 324t U. S. 826, 65 S. Ct." 855, 89 L. Ed. 1394 (1945),
where a divided court in a per curiam decision upheld the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court had upheld a commission
order denying plaintiff's application for a declaration that applicant was not
a subsidiary-such order being based on an interpretation of the words 'subject
to controlling influence' as including susceptibility to domination. There was
a dissent saying the order was arbitrary and capricious; and Republic Aviation
Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 324 U. S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982, 89 L. Ed. 1372 (1945),
in which ad hoc rulemaking of the commissign was upheld so that ". . . a 'rigid
scheme of remedies' is avoided and administrative flexibility within appropriate
statutory limitations obtained to accomplish the dominant purpose of the
legislation."
Both cases are distinguishable on their facts, but are closely in point in
principle.
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decree declaring the rights of the United States in this area as against
California, and enjoining California and all persons holding under
her from trespass on this area in violation of the rights of the United
States. California answered, claiming ownership of the soil of the
maritime belt as an incident of her sovereignty. The court held that
California was not the owner of the soil of the maritime belt, but
that paramount rights in and power over the area was vested in the
United States. The United States was granted the relief prayed for.
United States v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1658 (U. S. 1947).
State claims to ownership of the minerals beneath the marginal
sea were based primarily upon the contention that ownership was
an incident of state sovereignty, acquired from England by the states
through the Revolution, and subsequently recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in a long line of cases. The thirteen original
American Colonies acquired as sovereign states all the then attri-
butes of the Royal Sovereignty of England. Only those elements
of sovereignty specifically enumerated in the Constitution were sur-
rendered by the states to the federal government at the time of the
formation of the Union;2 all others were retained by the states,' and
acquired by other states on their subsequent admission into the
Union on an equal footing with the original states.4 If ownership
of the marginal sea had been acquired by the original states, either
as an incident of sovereignty or through grants, this right must have
been retained by the states on their admission into the Union, and
acquired by California on its subsequent admission. Th court,
however, concluded that the thirteen original states did not acquire
ownership of the marginal sea from England as an incident of
sovereignty, basing their decision on the fact that there was no
"settled international custom or understanding among nations" in
regard to ownership of the maritime belt,' nor any substantial his-
1. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U. S. 867, 416, 10 L. Ed. 997, 1014 (1842).
2. U. S. Const. Amend. X; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 212, 11
L. Ed. 565 (1845) dealing specifically with the "shores of navigable waters and
the soils under them"; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed.
588 (1876).
3. Note 2, supra.
4. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 55 L. Ed. 853, 31 S. Ct. 688 (1911).
5. Fenwick, International Law (2 ed. 1934) 277-278, 817-319; Higgins and
Colombos, International Law of the Sea (1 ed. 1943) 58, § 77 et seq.; I Hyde,
International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and applied by the U. S. (2 ed.
1945) 451, § 141; Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Juris-
diction (1 ed. 1927) chap. I and II; V Wheaton, Elements of International
Law (6 ed. 1929) 861; Wilson, Handbook of International Law (3 ed.
1939) 98, § 88; Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in Submerged
Lands of the Continental Shelf (1947) 56 Yale L. J. 356. As recently as the
1980 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law seventeen of
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torical support for the idea of a claim by the colonies to the mari-
time belt at the time independence was obtained.!
In many of the colonial charters appears language capable of
interpretation as a grant to the colonies, if not of ownership, at
least of the right to minerals, et cetera, within large areas of the
ocean off their coasts.7 However, it is difficult to understand by
what process the original states might have acquired ownership in
this coastal belt through such a grant from the Crown of England
had not ownership of the area been at that time an incident of
English sovereignty, and therefore capable of grant from the
Crown. Moreover, it is probable that any claim to ownership of
marginal seas made by the original states based on grants in the
Colonial Charters must be placed in the same category as similar
extravagant claims made by other nations at about the same time,
and since dropped for lack of recognition.'
The leading case of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan' announced the
rule of state ownership of inland navigable waters. These inland
navigable waters include rivers, lakes, bays and inlets,'0 and the
open sea down to the low water mark," the area between the high
thirty-six nations represented favored a national maritime belt of a width other
than three miles. I Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1 ed. 1940) 628.
Cf. Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea? (1923-1924) 4 British Year Book of
International Law 34; Ireland, Marginal Seas Around the States (1940) 2
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 252 and 436; Keeton, Federal and State Claims to Sub-
merged Lands Under Coastal Waters (1947) 25 Texas L. Rev. 262. But see
Queen v. Keyn, L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 63 (1876). Although refusing to extend
English criminal jurisdiction to offenses by foreigners on foreign vessels within
the three mile limit in the absence of a specific statute, the majority of the
court was of the opinion that the marginal sea was a part of the territory of
England. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1893).
6. Justice Reed dissented on this point stating that he believed that "the
original states did claim ...sovereignty and ownership to the three mile limit."
See also Ireland, Marginal Seas Around the States (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIEw 252, 271. The State of Texas contends that it has a special claim, stronger
than that of the other coastal states, to dominion over a maritime belt three
marine leagues (about 10.5 miles) in width. This contention is based on a claim
to that area by the Republic of Texas during its existence as a sovereign state,
and on the retention by Texas of all vacant and unappropriated lands within its
territorial limits by express provision of the Joint Congressional Resolution
admitting Texas into the Union.
7. Thorpe, American Charters, Constitutions and Organic Laws (I ed. 1909)
529 (Connecticut), 557 (Delaware), 765 (Georgia), 1677 (Maryland), 1846, 1870
(Massachusetts), 2433 (New Hampshire), 2533 (New Jersey), 1641 (New York),
2743, 2761 (North Carolina and South Carolina), 3035 (Pennsylvania), 3211
(Rhode Island), 3783, 8790, 3802 (Virginia).
8. Fenwick, International Law (2 ed. 1934) 317.
9. 44 U. S. 212, 11 L. Ed. 565 (1845).
10. Higgins and Colombos, International Law of the Sea (1 ed. 1943) 58,
§ 78, 142, § 179 (rivers), 111, § 143 et seq. (bays and inlets), 121-124, §§ 156-158
(lakes). "
11. United States v. State of California, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 1667 (U. S. 1917)
"If this rationale of the Pollard case is a valid basis for a conclusion that para-
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and low water marks being properly termed tidelands." In subse-
quent cases involving the application of this rule there frequently
appeared language clearly indicative that the court at that time con-
sidered state ownership to include the bed of the marginal sea, at
least within the three mile limit, although in no case was the court
called upon to extend state ownership beyond the low water mark. 3
In the present case, the court termed these statements merely
paraphrases or offshoots of the Pollard inland water rule, used not
in enunciation of a new ocean rule, but only in explanation of the
old inland water principle, and refused to extend the doctrine of
the Pollard case beyond its application to inland navigable waters.
The way to such an extension was clearly open to the court. In the
case-of inland navigable waters, the title to the bed and to all min-
erals found therein is vested in the states, while the federal govern-
ment exercises broad powers of regulation over the stream itself
and the uses to which it may be put, under its express grants of
mount rights run to the states in inland waters to the shoreward of the low
water mark, the same rationale lends to the conclusion that national interests . . .
are paramount in waters lying to the seaward in the three mile belt." Higgins
and Colombos, International Law of tlhe Sea (1 ed. 1942) 74, § 99.
12. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 22, 80
L. Ed. 9, 18, 56 S. Ct. 23, 29 (1935) ; Ballantine, Law Dictionary (1 ed. 1930) 1282.
13. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U. S. 367, 10 L. Ed. 997 (1842);
Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 471, 13 L. Ed. 220 (1850); Smith v. Maryland,
59 U. S. 71, 15 L. Ed. 269 (1855); Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 85 U. S.
57, 21 L. Ed. 814 (1873); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224 (1876);
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 248 (1876); San Francisco v.
LeRoy, 138 U. S. 656, 11 S. Ct. 364, 34 L. Ed. 1096 (1891); Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 11 S. Ct. 559, 35 L. Ed. 159 (1891); Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 11 S. Ct. 808, 838, 35 L. Ed. 428 (1891); Knight v. United
States Land Ass'n, 142 U. S. 161, 12 S. Ct. 258, 35 L. Ed. 974 (1891); Illinois
Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 13 S. Ct. 110, 36 L. Ed. 1018 (1892);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1893); St. Anthony
Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349, 18
S. Ct. 157, 42 L. Ed. 497 (1897); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 21
S. Ct. 48, 45 L. Ed. 126 (1900); Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 187 U. S.
479, 23 S. Ct. 17, 47 L. Ed. 266 (1903); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189
U. S. 391, 23 S. Ct. 606, 47 L. Ed. 865 (1903); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202
U. S. 1, 26 S. Ct. 40, 50 L. Ed. 913 (1906); The Vessel "Abby Dodge" v.
United States, 223 U. S. 166, 32 S. Ct. 310, 56 L. Ed. 390 (1912); United States
v. Chandler-Dunber Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 33 S. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed.
1063 (1912); Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251, 35
S. Ct. 551, 59 L. Ed. 939 (1915); Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. R. Co.,
255 U. S. 56, 41 S. Ct. 237, 65 L. Ed. 500 (1912); Oklahoma v. Texas, 58
U. S. 574, 42 S. Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed. 771 (1922); Massachusetts v. New York,
271 U. S. 65, 46 S. Ct. 357, 70 L. Ed. 838 (1926); United States v. Utah, 283
U. S. 64, 51 S. Ct. 438, 75 L. Ed. 844 (1931); United States v. Oregon, 295
U. S. 1, 55 S. Ct. 610, 79 L. Ed. 1267 (1935); Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v.
City of Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 56 S. Ct. 23, 80 L. Ed. 9 (1935); United
States v. O'Donnell, 303 U. S. 501, 58 S. Ct. 708, 82 L. Ed. 980 (1938); United
States v. Commodore Park, 324 U. S. 386, 65 S. Ct. 803,' 89 L. Ed. 1017 (1944).
But cf. Cunard .Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 122, 43 S. Ct. 504,
507, 67 L. Ed. 894, 902 (1922) wherein the court defined the territorial operation
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power in the Federal Constitution."4 The extent of this control was
considered in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Com-
pany, where the court stated:
"In our view it cannot properly'be said that the constitu-
tional power of the United States over its waters is limited to
control for navigation .... That authority is as broad as the
needs of commerce .... The point is that navigable waters are
subject to national planning and control in the broad regulation
of commerce granted to the federal government."1
Application of this rule to the marginal sea would have resulted
in state ownership of the bed of the ocean from the low water mark
to the three mile limit, with the federal government empowered
to exercise the necessary control over this area under the Commerce
clause and its war and treaty-making powers." Minerals within
the marginal sea would belong to the adjoining state. The court
preferred to make a distinction between inland navigable waters
and the open sea, the distinction apparently being based upon pre-
dominance of state interest in the former and predominance of
national interest in the latter, together with the further considera-
tion that the state lacked the powers and facilities for assumption
of the responsibilities which its ownership of the maritime belt
would entail.
Having disposed of the arguments supporting state ownership
of the area, the court without making use of the word ownership17
of the Eighteenth Amendment stating: "It now is settled in the U. S. and
recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes . . .
ports, harbors, bays and other enclosed arms of the sea along its coasts and a
marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a marine
league. . . ." citing Church v. Hubbard, supra, Manchester v. Massachusetts,
supra, and Louisiana V. Missssippi, supra. Further indications of a belief on
the part of the federal government that ownership of the maritime belt was
vested in the states are the numerous instances in which the federal government
acquired title to lands located in -the belt from states, and numerous refusals
by the Department of the Interior to grant federal leases to lands within the
belt. Hearings before Subcommittee 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary on
H. J. Res. 176, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939) at p. 172. In the present case,
the court stated that these instances of federal recognition of state ownership
could not operate as an estoppel to the assertion of federal ownership. But
cf. n. 18, infra.
14. U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
15. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 811 U. S. 877, 426,
61 S. Ct. 291, 308, 85 L. Ed. 243, 262-263 (1940).
16. U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Art. II, § 2.
17. Justice Frankfurter dissented, contending that ownership of the maritime
belt was neither in California nor the United States, but that the area should
be treated as unclaimed land. There are conflicting opinions as to the nature
of the right of a state in its maritime belt. Higgins and Colombos, International
Law of the Sea (1 ed. 1943) 59, §80.
[Vol. VIII
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stated that the federal government had "paramount rights in and
power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over
the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil," and
that "whatever of value may be discovered in the seas next to its
shores and within its protective belt will most naturally be appro-
priated for its [nation's] use."' 8
The basis of the court's decision was two-fold: (1) the federal
government rather than the states acquired the right to the mar-
ginal sea, since, assertion of the right was first made by the federal
government and subsequent assertions of that right by the federal
government had been considered by the court as binding upon it;1"
and (2) recognition of the necessity for federal ownership of the
marginal sea as a matter of national external sovereignty.2" The
conclusion is inescapable that the court was more strongly influ-
enced in its decision by the latter consideration:
"The three mile limit is but a recognition of the necessity
that a government next to the sea must be able to protect itself
from dangers incident to its location. It must have powers of
dominion and regulation in the interest of its revenues,- its
health, and the security of its people from wars waged in or too
near its coasts .... What this government does, or even what
the states do, anywhere in the ocean, is a subject upon which
the nation may enter into and assume treaty or similar inter-
national obligations. . . . The ocean, even its three mile belt,
is thus of vital consequence to the nation.
21
That the maritime states had been allowed to exercise "local police
power" in the area through acts similar to the assertions of authority
18. United States v. State of California, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 1668, 1666 (U. S.
1947).
19. First assertions of American dominion over the marginal sea were
found in notes from Secretary of State Jefferson to the British [H. Ed. Doe.
No. 824, 42nd Cong., 2d sess. (1872) 553-5541 and French [American State
Papers, I Foreign Relations (1833) 183, 884] Ministers in 1793. For subsequent
assertion of authority over the marginal sea, see 36 Stat. 326, 16 U. S. C. A.
§ 644 et seq. (1910); 37 Stat. 499, 16 U. S. C. A. § 632 et seq. (1912); 43
Stat. 604, 33 U. S. C. A. § 431 et seq. (1924); 43 Stat. (II) 1761 (1924); 59
Stat. (II) 884 (1945), 5 U. S. C. A. § 485 (Supp. 1946). A Presidential
Proclamation announcing that the natural resources of the sea bed of the
Continental Shelf contiguous to the United States were regarded as appertaining
to the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction and control. Church v.
Hubbard, 6 U. S. 186, 2 L. Ed. 249 (1804); Ex parte Cooper, 143 U. S. 472,
12 S. Ct. 453, 36 L. Ed. 232 (1891); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S.
100, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed. 894 (1922).
20. United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct.
216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1986).
21. United States v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 1666-1667 (U. S. 1947).
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in the area by the national government" was recognized, though
the extent of this police power was not discussed. Recent national
and international developments had necessitated a redrawing of the
nebulous line between the national external sovereignty and the
domestic sovereignty retained by the states. While the decision of
the court is clearly limited to the maritime belt off the State of Cal-
ifornia, there can be little doubt that it will be applicable to Loui-
siana and other maritime states. The United States Attorney Gen-
eral stated recently that a suit against the state of Louisiana was at
present being prepared.2"
Attempts have been made to imply federal recognition of Loui-
siana's ownership of its maritime belt from the grant to Louisiana
in its Enabling Act24 of title to all islands within three leagues of
its coasts, and the United States Supreme Court has recognized
such an interpretation.2" However, it would appear that the position
of Louisiana is no stronger than that of California in this regard,
in view of the fact that the Treaty of Guadaloupe Hildago26 speci-
fically fixed the boundaries of California at a point three miles
from its shores, and California claimed this boundary in its first
27
state constitution.
By statute Louisiana has extended her boundary twenty-seven
miles into the open sea off her coast.28 Although the ruling of the
instant case is limited to the marginal sea lying within the three
mile limit, it would appear that the reasoning supporting federal
dominion over that area would be even more strongly applicable
to the extension of control over any further maritime area beyond
that limit brought within the boundaries of the Union by state
declaration.
Louisiana has four types of coast line. The first type, the lower
delta below Forts Jackson and St. Philip in Plaquemines Parish, is,
22. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 26 S.' Ct. 408, 50 L. Ed. 913
(1906), discussing various instances of regulation by Louisiana of the oyster
beds off her southeastern coast.
23. Baton Rouge State Times (Wed., March 3, 1948) at p. 8B.
24. 2 Stat. 701 . (April 6, 1812) [Enabling Act]; 2 Stat. 708 (April 14,
1812) [added West Florida area to Louisiana].
25. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 26 S. Ct. 408, 50 L. Ed. 913 (1906).
26. 1 Treaties (Malloy, 1910) 1109; Treaty of July 4, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (1848).
27. Cal. Const. (1849) Art. XII, § 1.
28. La. Act 55 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9311.1-9331.4]. See Ireland,
Marginal Seas Around the States (1940) 2 LoUISIANA LAw REVIEW 252, 280-283;
Lovet, Louisiana's Twenty-seven Mile Maritime Belt( 1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev.
253; (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 317 (denying validity of statute). Leases have been
granted in this area. Coastal Drilling (Sept. 15, 1945) Business Week 35.
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in general, registering a gain due to silt brought down by the Mis-
sissippi River. The coast to the north and east, lying for the most
part in St. Bernard Parish, was once an area of gain. About the
eighth century, A. D., the Mississippi, which once emptied there,
had built up the land to a point slightly beyond the present location,
of the Chandeleur Islands, which represent that ancient beach. Since
the change in the course of the river, the coast line is receding to
the west at a rapid rate. The Chandeleur Islands are retiring west-
ward even more rapidly. The third type of coast, from the lower
delta westward to Vermillion Bay, lying mostly in Terrebonne Par-
ish, represents a more advanced development of the St. Bernard
coast. There the ancient beach, similar to the Chandeleurs, has be-
come tangential to the coast at many points. The shoreline con-
tinues to recede, though not so rapidly as that of St. Bernard. The
remainder of the Louisiana coast represents a still further develop-
ment. The ancient beach has integrated itself with the mainland.
The shoreline in this region is fairly stable. It is, on the whole,
retreating slowly, though there are some local gains at the mouths
of principal rivers. The over-all result has been a loss of territory.
The loss since 1812 has been considerable, and the process will con-
tinue.29
The line of division between state and federal control in the
area is apparently fixed at the low water mark.8" However, the fore-
going indicates the existence of a large body of land off the Loui-
siana coast which has sunk below the low water mark, presumably
since federal acquisition of the maritime belt.8 ' At the same time, a
smaller body of land has been built up above the old low water
mark. In the event of the application of the instant decision to
Louisiana, the question of the status of the title to this land under
Louisiana rules of property might become'of prime importance.
One well, Superior Oil Company's Vermillion Block No. 17 has been drilled
approximately thirty miles below the low water mark. It is not producing.
29. Address by Dr. R. J. Russell, Professor and Head of Dept. of
Geography; Assistant Director, School of Geology, Louisiana State University,
before Seminar in Contemporary Legal Problems, Louisiana State University
Law School. See La. Dept. of Conservation Geological Survey, Bulletin No. 8
(1936) entitled The Lower Mississippi Delta.
30. Supra note 19.
31. The time at which control of the marginal sea vested in the federal
government is not clear. Control of the area was not considered an attribute
of sovereignty at the time of the Treaty of Paris (1783). United States v.
California, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 1665 (1947). Control was asserted for the first time
by the federal government in 1793. Supra note 19. The first definite indication
that the United States Supreme Court considered dominion over the maritime
belt an attribute of sovereignty came in 1842. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell
41 U. S. 367, 10 L. Ed. 997 (1842).
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Land built up by natural causes from the' bed of the sea may pass
to the littoral proprietor, in which case there would seem to be no
question of federal dominion. This is the general common law
rule. 2 On the other hand, this land may retain its status as com-
mon a3 property. The latter view appears to be supported by the
Civil Code.84 If this land retains its status as common property,
but does not remain under federal dominion, control-at least so
far as the leasing power is concerned-would appear to be in the
state. It appears probable that Louisiana will rule that land submerg-
ing so as to become part of the bed of the sea becomes common
property.85 Presumably, this rule will insure federal dominion over
all land and works thereon which have become submerged since
federal acquisition of the maritime belt. Assuming that federal
dominion over the marginal sea extends only to the low water mark,
there is still an area of seashore between the high and low water
marks which is common property," and apparently susceptible oflease by the state.
The effect of the court's ruling might well be far reaching,
comprehending as it does all things of value whatsoever, found
within the maritime belt. This category would include, in addition
to oil, all minerals whether found in the sea or in its bed, all types
of marine life, and any remunerative uses to which the water itself
might be put. 7 The right of a state to regulate the fishing rights in
the marginal sea off its coasts has been frequently recognized, even
to the extent of an exclusion of citizens of other states of the Union
desiring to exercise those rights. 8 Continued state regulation, at
least to the extent previously permissible, would appear difficult of
reconciliation with complete federal dominion, and this would hold
true not only in regard to fishing rights, but also with regard to all
other things of value found within the area. However, the extent
of the "local police power" over the area left to the states remains
as yet undefined.
32. Stevens v. Arnold, 262 U. S. 266, 43 S. Ct. 560, 67 L. Ed. 974 (1922).
33. Art. 450, La. Civil Code of 1870.
34. Art. 510, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Zeller v. Southern Yacht
Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882).
35. Arts. 450 and 482, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Miami Corporation
v. State, 186 La. 784, 807, 173 So. 315, 822 (1937). This is the French view.
6 Laurent, Principes de droit civil (2 ed. 1876) 66, no 44.
36. Arts. 450 and 451, La. Civil Code of 1870.
87. In addition to oil, the maritime belt off the coasts of Louisiana is
known to contain valuable deposits of sulphur, salt, and shell deposits. The
area is also rich in fish, shrimp, and oysters.
38. Corfield v. Corell, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230 (C. C. Wash. 1925); Louisiana
v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 26 S. Ct. 408, 50 L. Ed. 913 (1906).
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The scope of the instant decision, and its impact upon estab-
lished conceptions of the relationship between federal and state
powers will soon be tested in the case of Toomer v. Witsell. 9 This
case presents an attack upon discrimination by state licensing statute
in favor of state residents in regard to fishing rights within the
maritime belt off the coasts of the state. The Federal District Court
(sitting as a three judge court) upheld the validity of the state
statute. The validity of discriminatory state regulation of fisheries
in the marginal sea off its coasts, at least in the absence of federal
regulation, was based principally on the cases of McReady v. Vir-
ginia, Manchester v. Massachusetts, Louisiana v. Mississippi, and the
vessel "Abby Dodge" v. United States.4 ° United States v. California
was distinguished as holding that the state was not the owner of
the land underlying the marginal sea and had no claim to the oil
therein, but as not affecting the right of a state to exercise police
power and to regulate fishing in the area. This case was appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, has been argued, and is now
awaiting decision.4
There can be no doubt that the language used in United States
v. California did not limit federal dominion over the resources of
the marginal sea to oil alone, although, of course, the injunction
issued was itself so limited. Furthermore, while it is true that the
Supreme Court, in the California case, expressly recognized the
right of the states to exercise police power in this area, it would
not seem that the scope of this police power could extend to the
enactment of regulatory licensing statutes, a right which is usually
considered as flowing only from complete authority over the thing
regulated. Police power of the type exercised by the state in keeping
the peace in federal post offices, which are subjects of federal owner-
ship and jurisdiction, is one thing; a police power exercised to limit
the use of the thing regulated to a certain class of persons is quite
another thing. State regulation of fishing rights in the marginal
sea might be upheld in the absence of federal regulation, but the
power of the state to regulate would not seem to be unlimited, even
in that situation.
It follows from federal dominion over the oil beneath the mar-
ginal sea that the lessor's royalties and the consideration of the min-
eral leases therein are due to the federal government. The United
39. 73 Fed. Supp. 371 (1947).
40. All cases, cited supra note 18.
41. 16 Law Week 3259.
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States Attorney General has stated, however, that no repayment of
revenues collected from these oil deposits prior to the decision in
the present case will be demanded from the states.
. Any change in the status accorded the marginal sea by this
decision is now in' the hands of Congress; further manifestations of
federal dominion, and consequent limitation of state regulatory
power, or a grant of these lands to the respective maritime states
must await congressional action. 2 A number of bills proposing a
quitclaim of this area to the states have been introduced at the
present session of Congress.
JOHN PAUL WOODLEY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
SEGREGATED EDUCATION-The passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments theoretically placed the negro in a posi-
tion of civil and political equality; but, practically, the manner in
which the rights bestowed by these amendments are enjoyed is a
problem of today. That the negro is entitled to education cannot
be seriously denied,1 but the question of whether or not he may
validly complain because in some states such education is separate
and segregated from that of white men raises new and complex
political and social considerations. Sipuel v. Board of Regents of
University of Oklahoma, 16 U. S. L. Week 4090, 8 C. C. H. Bull.
339, 68 S. Ct. 299 (1948).
The United States Supreme Court long ago declared that the
policy of segregation is a social problem and not within the inhibi-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The leading case of Plessy
v. Ferguson upheld the constitutionality of this policy and remains
today the bfckbone of judicial precedent on this point.
"The object of the Fourteenth amendment was undoubt-
edly intended to enforce the absolute equality of the two races
before the law, but in the nature of things, it could not have
42. The recent history of congressional action in regard to the marginal
sea is significant. Both houses of Congress passed a joint resolution quitclaiming
the area to the States, H. J. Res. 225, 79th Congress, 2d sess. (1946) ; 92 Cong..
Rec. 9642, 10316 (1946), which was, however, vetoed by the President (92nd
Cong. Rec. 10660 (1946), and his veto was sustained, 92nd Cong. Rec. 10745
(1946). Congressional disposition of this area would be upheld under the power
of the Congress to dispose of property belonging to the United States. U. S.
Const. Art. IV,3.
1. Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 16 U. S. L.
Week 4090, 8 C.C.H. U.S.S.C. Bull. 339, 68 S. Ct. 299 (1948).
2. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1877).
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